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DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE

THAT WE KILL THE COMPETITIVE
GOOSE? PRICING LOCAL PHONE
SERVICES TO RIVALS
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL*
THOMAS W. MERRILL**
This Article concludes a series by these authors and Professors J. Gregory Sidak
and Daniel F. Spulber, published last year in this journal. Here, Professors
Baumol and Merrill address the issues surroundingthe pricingof local phone services to long distance rivals, clarifying theirpoints of agreement and disagreement
with Sidak and Spulber. In theirprevious articles, Sidak and Spulber argued that
the movement toward competition in local telephone service should be accompanied by substantial compensation to existing local telephone carriers, a view that
Baumol and Merrill do not share. Rather, they note three points of disagreement
between Sidak and Spulber and themselves. First, they maintain that Sidak and
Spulber use an incorrectformula to determine whether the transitionfrom regulated monopoly to competition requires compensation. Second, they argue that
neither the Compensation Clause nor the regulatory contract requires compensation to take place ex ante. Finally,they do not believe that the magnitude of fixed
and common costs will be significant in local telephony.

INTRODUCTION

In recent articles in this and another journal,' J. Gregory Sidak
and Daniel F. Spulber have undertaken to damn us2 with considerable
praise. We accept the praise with gratitude, and acknowledge that
* Director, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University; Senior
Research Economist and Professor Emeritus, Princeton University. B.S.S., 1942, City College of New York; Ph.D., 1949, University of London.
** John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., 1971, Grinnell
College; B.A., 1973, Oxford University; J.D., 1977, University of Chicago.
1 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1068 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Givings
and Takings]; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the
Telecommons]. Their original article to which we addressed our critique is J. Gregory
Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract,
71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 851 (1996) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings]. These
articles have been collected with additional commentary in J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (1997). Our critique appears
in William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037 (1997).
2 In what follows, the term "us" or its counterpart "we" will be meant to encompass
not only the two current authors, but also Professors Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig,
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they have generally represented our analytic position accurately. But
they have moved us no closer to acceptance of their conclusion that,
before the nation moves to competition in local telephony, local telephone carriers must be afforded substantial compensation for anticipated lost profits. We nevertheless concur with their judgment that
the discussion has served to clarify the issues, and our objective here is
to contribute still further clarification.
I
WHAT

Is

THE ARGUMENT ABOUT?

The issue underlying our more general exchange on law and economic theory, in brief, is this. Local telephone companies in the
United States (local exchange carriers, or LECs) are anxious to receive permission to enter long-distance service in competition with
AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and the other current interexchange carriers
(IXCs).3 Today, however, virtually all long-distance calls, particularly
those between households, use LEC-owned monopoly facilities

(called "bottleneck facilities") in originating and receiving calls. This
means that in order to deliver a long-distance call an IXC must almost
always employ these bottleneck facilities, paying the local telephone
companies for their use. The IXCs take the position that the prices
they are charged for this use are excessive. If so, this will obviously
distort competition in long-distance service when and if the local companies are permitted to enter the field, because they can use excessive
charges for access to local facilities to handicap and even destroy their
future long-distance rivals.
A second and analogous pricing issue which has arisen more recently will play a critical role in the future of telecommunications ser4
vice in the United States. In the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Congress decided to permit local carriers to enter into long-distance
service.5 But Congress also recognized that if such entry is to enhance
competition rather than destroy it, the effective monopolies of the local companies must first be brought to an end. Congress therefore
also permitted entry by the IXCs and other potential competitors into
local service. Legal permission, however, is not enough. If new local
whose names are invoked, not quite in vain, along with ours throughout the Sidak-Spulbor
discussion.
3 It should be clear to the reader that Sidak and Spulber are affiliated with the LECs
while we are associated with the IXCs. However, the principles all of us have enunciated
in this debate have been asserted by us elsewhere without the sponsorship of any firms.
4 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47

U.S.C.).
5 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1998).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1122

competition is to succeed, it must be financially feasible. Indeed, because local exchange service requires enormous sunk investment,
6
there has so far been little actual entry into local exchange markets.
Fortunately, Congress recognized the high cost and risk confronting any entrant that undertakes to build the necessary facilities
itself. It therefore authorized a second method of entry: The 1996
Act requires local telephone companies to offer space on their facilities to entrants at appropriate rental fees. 7 Entrants are permitted to
select those portions of the LEC facilities that they need in order to
provide competitive local service, without being made to pay for
rental of facilities that they do not need. 8 Congress further specified
that the rental price must not be excessive, 9 because too high an entry
price is tantamount to outright refusal to provide the facilities.
The issue, then, is a matter of these two interconnection prices:
the prices for completion of long-distance messages and the prices for
rental of local telephone facilities. The local telephone companies say
that the new Act threatens them with interconnection prices that will
not enable them to recover their common costs and "stranded investments"-the investments that will become redundant because competition will cut into the business of the local telephone companies.' 0
Such inadequate interconnection prices, they argue, therefore constitute an illegal taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or, alternatively, a breach of the regulatory contract that the LECs have
justifiably relied upon in creating their local networks. Their opponents, the IXCs and other potential entrants into local telephone service, argue that the local companies are seeking freedom to exact
prices that will undercut or destroy competition before competition is
even able to materialize effectively.

6 See Leslie Cauley, Open and Closed: Genuine Competition in Local Phone Service
Is a Long Distance Off, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1997, at Al (discussing Telecommunications
Act of 1996's disincentive effects on entry into local exchange markets).
7 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1998). Sidak and Spulber are, at best, suspicious of this approach: "Before creating new forms of regulation of network industries,
such as the unbundling requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, regulators
should compare the costs and benefits." Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note
1, at 1077. Those costs and benefits should, indeed, be considered. But one must not
forget that if unbundling fails to materialize, and the LECs retain their monopoly power,
one surely can expect really onerous reregulation to follow.
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1998).

9 See id. § 252(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1998).
10 See, e.g., Comments of the United States Telephone Association, In Re Access
Charge Reform, FCC Docket No. 96-262, at 68-76 (Jan. 29, 1997) (reflecting concerns of
local telephone companies).
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The efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) discussed at length
by Sidak and Spulber11 is a rule that one of us and his colleagues have
devised and advocated to deal with such interconnection pricing
problems. 12 In essence, ECPR says that the proper price for the
rental of monopoly-owned facilities to competitors for use in the final
product market is the incremental cost of the requested use of those
facilities, plus compensation for any legitimate contribution toward recovery of fixed and common costs that become stranded as a result of
provision of the facilities to competitors. We have shown that when
interconnection prices are set in accordance with ECPR, the more efficient of the two competitors in the final product market-whether it
be the facilities' owner or a rival-wiU obtain a competitive advantage
exactly equal to the cost advantage it derives from its superior
efficiency. 13
II
WHERE WE AGREE AND WHY WE
ULTIMATELY DISAGREE

We are now in a position to identify the extent to which we share
common ground with Sidak and Spulber, and the extent to which we
disagree. Once we have pinpointed the remaining areas of disagreement, we can attempt to identify the sources of that disagreement and
respond to new arguments advanced by Sidak and Spulber in opposition to our position.
A.

Interconnection Pricing Principles

In general, it appears that there is little difference between Sidak
and Spulber and us over the principles that ought to govern the prices
charged to competitors for access to local exchange facilities or the
rental of unbundled network elements. We agree with Sidak and
Spulber that all fixed and common costs of the LECs should be recovered in these prices, unless those costs entail wasteful expenditures or
inefficient equipment and activities. 14 For their part, Sidak and
Spulber appear to agree with us, at least in principle, that the opportunity cost component of the ECPR price should preserve none of the
11 See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1084-1103, 1111-

46.

12 See, e.g., William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 Yale J. on
Reg. 145, 145-63 (1997) (summarizing ECPR and responding to critics).
13 See id. at 151-53.
14 See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1147-48.
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monopoly profit that the local telephone company may be earning
15
before competition becomes effective.
We also agree with Sidak and Spulber that any substantial 16 costs
stranded by competition should be recoverable, normally through
pricing mechanisms. 17 The prices used for these purposes should be
carefully designed to ensure competitive neutrality, meaning that they
must satisfy the parity principle of ECPR.
Finally, we agree that the appropriate price for access of longdistance messages to the local network or for the rental of network
elements in general will not equal the bare incremental cost incurred
by the local telephone company in supplying these services to others.18
We would, however, insist that those prices be based on those incremental costs, meaning that they should be based on forward-looking
calculations and on costs actually caused by the supply of those
services.
We also agree with Sidak and Spulber that the discussion has produced considerable clarification of the pricing issues. 19 Here we cite
in particular their unambiguous conclusion "that the incumbent's
price for an unbundled network element [should be] capped by the
entrant's stand-alone cost of supplying that input. '20 Imposing such a
cap on interconnection prices will ensure that no monopoly profit is
included in the prices. We also applaud their call to regulators to
eliminate the tangle of cross-subsidies that characterize pricing of local services: "[R]egulators should rebalance the rates of the incumbent LECs to eliminate cross-subsidization."' This too is a necessary
step that must be taken if interconnection prices based on ECPR are
to produce efficient results.
There are a number of other points where we are not sure
whether Sidak and Spulber are in agreement with us, although it is
See id. at 1143.
The term "substantial" is used here to indicate that when such costs are trivial, as we
believe they likely are in the local telephone market, see infra text accompanying notes 7582, other competitively neutral means that are less difficult to administer may well be the
preferable approach for their recovery.
17 See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1144-45.
18 See id. at 1147-48. Here we must protest that Sidak and Spulber inaccurately attribute to us the view that prices of unbundled network elements should be set equal to total
service long run incremental costs. See id. at 1134, 1137. As far as we can determine, none
of us has ever said that, even inadvertently.
19 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1070.
20 Id. at 1079.
21 Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1144. A cross-subsidy is said to occur in a multiproduction firm if the prices of some of its products yield
revenues insufficient to cover their pertinent costs but the prices of other products exceed
their costs sufficiently to make up the deficiency.
15
16
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conceivable that they would concur. First, although they acknowledge
the need for a stand alone cost ceiling and elimination of crosssubsidies,2 it is critical that these constraints be adopted either before
or simultaneously with ECPR pricing if the latter is to contribute to
economic efficiency and the general welfare. It has long been recognized in the economic literature 3 that introduction of only some but
not all of the requirements of economic efficiency can easily make
things worse, rather than better.24 Failure to enforce a stand-alone
cost ceiling along with adoption of ECPR for access pricing can obviously preserve monopoly profits in some or all of the incumbent's activities. And retention of cross-subsidies can continue to prevent
entry into the subsidized activities by giving the incumbent a pricing
advantage that no entrant can afford to replicate.2s
Second, the common costs that we all agree should be recoverable by some ECPR supplement should include only common costs
that are also fixed, and should exclude all variable common cost components.26 This is because the latter automatically enter into any
properly calculated incremental cost figure. To include them in any
22 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1079; Sidak & Spulber,
Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1145.
23 The discussion refers to this concept as "the theory of the second best." See generally Richard Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. of
Econ. Stud. 11 (1956).
24 Thus, while we acknowledge Sidak and Spulber's citation of our view that "distortion
of access pricing is the wrong instrument for elimination of monopoly power or monopoly
profits," Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1143, we must
emphasize that retention of monopoly power can undermine the promised efficiency contribution of ECPR, such that other (and appropriate) means must be used along with or
before the adoption of efficient access pricing to eliminate such monopoly elements.
25 It should also be kept in mind that where there is a cross-subsidy, meaning that some
output is sold at a price below its incremental cost, there is a negative opportunity cost, i.e.,
a net gain to the seller from loss of some sales of that item. Followed to its logical conclusion, ECPR requires that the rental price of facilities to a competitor for use in supplying
such a service should be below the direct incremental cost of those facilities' services, i.e.,
the rental price should equal the direct incremental cost plus the negative opportunity cost.
Otherwise, as is easy to prove, the competitor will be discriminated against and will be
unable to compete against even a less efficient incumbent.
26 An example will clarify the difference between the role of fixed and variable common costs. Suppose that a rise in the demand of resellers leads the incumbent firm to
purchase 50 more repair vehicles than it would have bought otherwise. Even though these
50 new trucks devote 10% of their time to serving the incumbent's customers rather than
resellers, if simultaneously five older vehicles are transferred to reseller service, it is clear
that the cost of 50 nev trucks is exclusively the responsibility of reseller demand. Though
the particular vehicles just purchased are a common facility, there is a net addition of 50
trucks serving resellers which would not have occurred if reseller demand had not grown.
In contrast, the initial expenditure on a roadbed of a railroad is a cost that is fixed and
common to all types of freight carried, and does not fall when there is a decline in the
volume of coal carried, so that it constitutes no part of the incremental cost of coal or any
other individual type of freight.
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ECPR supplement above direct incremental cost would be double
counting and would constitute overpayment to the owners of local
facilities.
Third, it is not only forgone monopoly profit that should be excluded from the ECPR calculation. Any distortion in the final product price that yields excessive returns should be eliminated, whether
those excessive returns are plowed back into cross-subsidies, used to
cover waste and inefficiency, or devoted to any purposes other than
supply and improvement of the final product in question. Otherwise
the entire pricing arrangement will be distorted, and ECPR will only
help to preserve the resulting inefficiencies.
Finally, it does not matter whether the final price distortions were
deliberately introduced by the incumbent firm, imposed by regulation,
or caused in some other way. What is at issue is not a reward for good
intentions or a penalty for evil thoughts. An inefficiency caused by a
price distortion is an inefficiency and is damaging to consumer welfare
even if it is the result of the most laudable motivation. The obvious
fact is that local telephone rates are a mass of distortions and, until
something is done to eliminate those distortions, ECPR pricing of
services provided to competitors will only compound the resulting
mess. 27

B.

ConstitutionalCompensation Principles

When we turn from pricing issues to constitutional and regulatory
contract principles, it is less clear where our agreement with Sidak and
Spulber begins and ends. No doubt this is because there are no modern Supreme Court decisions concerning the compensation owed to
an incumbent utility whose monopoly service area is opened to competition, 28 and so the applicable legal principles are a matter of considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, at least at the most general level
27 Already we are witnessing decisions by local regulators that purport to embrace
ECPR but that are rendered bizarre by the Byzantine structure of consumer prices that the
decisions allow to remain in place. See, e.g., In re AT&T Communications, No. 95-C-0657,
177 P.U.R. 4th 110, 110 (N.Y. P.S.C. Apr. 1, 1997) (setting permanent rate levels for sale
by incumbent LEC of unbundled network elements to competing carriers).
28 We agree with Sidak and Spulber that Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945), is not a directly applicable precedent. In that case, the
Court assumed the competition was caused by exogenous changes in technology and consumer preferences, not deliberate governmental policy. See id. at 554, 567. Moreover, we
are puzzled by their claim, see Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1071,
that we asserted the opposite in our previous article. Market Street Railway was cited in
only two footnotes in our article, see Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1043 n.19, 1049
n.46, and in neither instance for the proposition that a regulated firm "has no valid takings
claim for the diminution in the value of its franchise due to deregulation," Sidak &
Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1071.
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of analysis, we do not detect any truly fundamental disagreement here
either.
In our previous article, we set forth our understanding of the constitutional and regulatory contract fights of regulated public utilities 2 9
As we read the Supreme Court's most directly relevant takings decisions, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch30 and Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,31 regulated utilities are entitled to a
risk-adjusted competitive return on their investment. 3Z This means
they are entitled to recover their reasonable costs plus a return on
investment in regulated assets "'commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks." 33 The competitive return must be determined in light of the rate base selected by
regulators and the consistency with which the regulators apply that
rate base. Our analysis of the regulatory contract was slightly more
complicated, but essentially we concluded that the only contractual
promise by the government that has been established with the required clarity is the promise that utilities be given an opportunity to
recover their reasonable costs and to earn a competitive return on
their investment. 34 In other words, the Takings Clause and the regulatory contract converge to support the same entitlement: the right to a
competitive return on investment.
As we read their two most recent articles, Sidak and Spulber do
not contest this understanding of the law. Indeed, at one point they
appear to embrace the same understanding, noting that "[u]tlities
made past expenditures to perform obligations to serve in expectation
29 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1041-51.
30 488 U.S. 299 (1989).

31 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
32 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1041-45.
33 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314 (quoting Hope, 320 U.S. at 603).
34 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1045-51. Sidak and Spulber devote consider-

able space to arguing that United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). signals an
important shift in the attitude of the Supreme Court toward enforcing regulatory contracts.
See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1147-52. This remains to be
seen. Although the Court quite properly took a dim view of the government's blatant
breach of its promise in the circumstances presented in Winstar, see Winstar, 518 U.S. at
870-73, the Court in recent years has shown a pronounced tendency to talk tough about
property rights and then beat a hasty retreat when presented with complex regulatory
schemes generating pools of winners and losers. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes
and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 Win. & Mary L Rev.
1099, 1131-40 (1997) (arguing that pragmatic concerns of Justice Kennedy are key to

Court's takings jurisprudence); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 139, 146 (1988) (reviewing recent takings
decisions). In any event, we stand by the position taken in our earlier article that Winstar

does not change the venerable "unmistakability" standard for identifying enforceable regulatory contracts. See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1,at 1046.
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of the reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of investment plus a
competitive rate of return. '35 Moreover, at various points in their discussion, they acknowledge that no compensation is required for government action that eliminates monopoly or cartel pricing;3 6 no
compensation is required for losses caused by exogenous market
forces; 37 and no compensation is required for losses that regulated
utilities can foreseeably mitigate.3 8 We agree with each of these
qualifications. 3

9

C.

Three Disagreements

Wherein then lies the disagreement? As we see it, there are three
significant areas where Sidak and Spulber diverge from us. In part
these differences stem from disagreements about what the law requires at an intermediate level of generality; in part they stem from
disagreements about the facts as they pertain to local telephony in the
United States.
Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1076.
See id. at 1104, 1106.
37 See id. at 1089, 1110.
38 See id. at 1138.
39 Sidak and Spulber devote considerable space in their most recent article to what they
describe as "the important but neglected" Supreme Court decision in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915). See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and
Takings, supra note 1, at 1071, 1082-87. The decision's obscurity is, in fact, well deserved.
First, the precise holding in Northern Pacific Railway-that a regulated utility earning constitutionally adequate revenues overall may not be required to offer particular services at
noncompensatory rates, see Northern Pac. Ry., 236 U.S. at 599-604--has been overruled.
See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146, 150 (1953) ("[S]o long as
rates as a whole afford railroads just compensation for their over-all services to the public
the Due Process Clause should not be construed as a bar to the fixing of noncompensatory
rates for carrying some commodities when the public interest is thereby served."); see also
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1989) (holding disallowance of return on portion of utility investment not unconstitutional, provided adequate return is afforded overall). Second, the statements in Northern Pacific Railway to the effect that a
regulated carrier may not be required to dedicate its property for a purpose other than
those "which inhere in the nature of the business," Northern Pac.Ry., 236 U.S. at 595, are
inconsistent with the modem understanding of the breadth of the "public use" requirement
of the law of eminent domain. According to the modem understanding, the government
may direct that property be rededicated to any rational purpose, as long as the government
pays "just compensation." See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)
(holding that exercise of eminent domain power must be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose"); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that role of judiciary in determining whether eminent domain is being used for proper purpose is "extremely
narrow"). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 61 (1986) (surveying uses to which power of eminent domain has been put). Since
Sidak and Spulber do not argue that achieving competition in local telephony is not a
rational purpose, the only issues are whether LECs are entitled to just compensation for a
taking of their property and, if so, when such compensation must be paid. Northern Pacific
Railway does not advance our understanding of either question.
35
36
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The first area of disagreement concerns the formula they advocate for determining whether the transition from regulated monopoly
to competition requires the payment of compensation to the incumbent utility. Essentially, their formula incorporates the historical profits of the incumbent as a fixed entitlement. 40 Our position, in contrast,
is that the incumbent utility is entitled to compensation only to the
extent that competition prevents it from recovering its reasonable
costs and earning a competitive return on its investment. Such compensation may well diverge from recovery of the full historical level of
profit.
The second area of disagreement concerns the timing of the compensation inquiry. Sidak and Spulber insist that the compensation inquiry take place ex ante, before local competition occurs. 41 This
means that the regulator must calculate the present value of the expected profit under both regulation and competition, and provide for
payment of the difference to the incumbent in the form of "a competitively neutral and nonbypassable end-user charge" or its
equivalent. 42 Our position is that neither the Takings Clause nor the
regulatory contract require the payment of compensation ex ante
rather than ex post. Moreover, there are simply too many uncertain
variables to allow regulators (or courts) to determine ex ante whether
compensation is or is not required. Accordingly, we believe the compensation inquiry should be postponed until the Telecommunications
Act is fully implemented.
The third area of disagreement concerns the probable magnitude
of fixed and common costs that will be stranded by the Telecommunications Act. Sidak and Spulber cite filings by two local carriers claiming to show that these costs will be very large.43 But these are hardly
dispassionate calculations, and they have been disputed by the IXCs.4
For a variety of reasons, including but not limited to the valuable quid
pro quo the local carriers will receive in the form of access to the longdistance market, we continue to believe that the magnitude of
stranded costs will not be significant in local telephony.
The next three Parts elaborate briefly on each of these three areas of disagreement.
See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 1, at 919-20.
See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1077.
Id. at 1079.
43 See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1138 (citing
filings by GTE Florida and Ameritech).
44 See, e.g., In re Petitions by AT&T Communications of the Southern States et al., No.
40

41
42

960847-TP, 1996 WL 599779, at *13-*15 (Fla. P.S.C. Oct. 11, 1996) (setting forth position
taken by AT&T and MCI).
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III
THE FORMULA FOR COMPENSATION

Although Sidak and Spulber disclaim any reliance on historical
costs in setting interconnection prices, they continue to insist on full
recovery of an incumbent utility's historical profits through their
formula for compensation. 45 Their clarified position is that ECPR determines "(1) the efficient price for the incumbent's sale of unbundled
network access to competitors" but that, in addition, "takings jurisprudence and the law of contracts require the government to afford the
incumbent the reasonable opportunity to recover its total economic
costs-through an end-user charge or other means. ' 46 We have no
disagreement in principle with dividing the total compensation to incumbents between competitively neutral interconnection prices
charged to competitors and competitively neutral charges to end-users
designed to assure full compensation for stranded investment costs.
We do disagree, however, with the way Sidak and Spulber define "the
total economic costs" that incumbents are entitled to recover through
their proposed end-user charges. 47

In their most recent articles, Sidak and Spulber speak occasionally as if the Constitution and the regulatory contract require that regulated utilities recover all the revenues they expected to earn under
regulation. 48 By this they surely mean net revenues or profits, for recovery of expected gross revenues would lead to excessive compensation on any reckoning. For example, if competition leads to losses in
market share for the incumbent, the foregone sales will result at least
to some extent in lower variable costs. No one would advocate that
incumbent utilities be compensated for costs that are entirely avoidable, such as foregone variable costs. Yet this is precisely what would
be implied by a requirement that incumbent utilities preserve the full
amount of gross revenues they earned under regulation.
In fact, the intended meaning of net revenues is spelled out
clearly in their original article, where they explain their formula for
compensation in terms of expectation damages, which they denote as
A.49 They state that:
45 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1078-79.

46 Id. at 1080.
47 See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 1, at 919-20.
48 For example, in what purports to be a careful statement of the conditions that give
rise to a requirement of compensation, they state: "Four conditions appear to be both
necessary and sufficient to establish a deregulatory taking: (1) the existence of a regulatory
contract; (2) evidence of investment-backed expectations; (3) the elimination of regulatory
entry barriers; and (4) a decline in the regulated firm's expected revenues." Sidak &
Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1097.
49 See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 1, at 923.
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= (R 1e - c l e ) - (R 2 - C 2 )

where R1e and C1e are the expected revenues and expected costs under
regulation, and R2 and C are the expected revenues and expected
costs under competition.50 The Sidak-Spulber formula for compensation thus requires that regulators determine the expected net revenues
or profits under regulation and the expected net revenues or profits
under competition. They then must subtract the expected profits
under competition from the expected profits under regulation, and
award the difference to the incumbent utility. The effect of this
formula is to lock in the expected profits of the incumbent utility
under regulation as a fixed entitlement.
The principal problem with this fixed entitlement is that Sidak
and Spulber assume that the expected revenues and expected costs of
the incumbent utility under regulation, R 0 and C11, are the expected
historical revenues and costs of the incumbent utility. Thus, the
formula takes no account of the possibility that the historicalrevenues
and costs may deviate from the reasonable revenues and costs, i.e.,
those that would be sufficient to insure a competitive return on competitively valued investment. Historical costs, as we have emphasized,
may include excessive returns, whether reflected in monopoly profits,
cross-subsidies, or inefficiency and waste. Yet the Sidak-Spulber
formula for compensation locks in these excessive returns, and requires that they be fully reflected in the competitively neutral enduser charges that the incumbent utility must receive to top off the
ECPR-determined payments it obtains from competitors.
For reasons already explained, 5 ' we do not believe that either the
Constitution or the regulatory contract requires that incumbent utilities be compensated for profits lost when the forces of competition
squeeze excessive returns out of their systems. The Takings Clause
and the regulatory contract require that utilities be afforded an opportunity to recover their reasonable costs plus a competitive return on
investment; they do not guarantee preservation of preexisting levels of
profit.
Moreover, providing a guarantee that incumbent utilities will recover the full measure of profit they earned under regulationwhether that recovery takes place through adjustments in prices
charged to competitors, competitively neutral end-user fees, or direct
compensation from the government-will necessarily interject inefficiencies into the system. There are at least two clear reasons for this.
First and most obvious, such a guarantee is similar to a cost-plus con50

See id.

51 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1042-51.
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tract in that it removes all incentive for elimination of waste and inefficiency. If payments to the firm remain constant regardless of its
pertinent performance, why should it devote any funds or effort to
efficiency? Second, the magnitude of price clearly affects behavior,
and an efficient price is defined as one that elicits behavior that most
effectively promotes the public interest. Sidak and Spulber appear to
favor adoption of such efficient prices-but with the addition of a supplement based on historic costs. 5 2 The resulting sum of these two
prices can no longer constitute an efficient price and will result in what
economists call "allocative inefficiencies," i.e., induced distortions of
supplier and consumer behavior that are inconsistent with economic
efficiency.
To bring their formula into line with the Constitution, the regulatory contract, and economic efficiency, Sidak and Spulber must at a
minimum adjust their before-and-after measures of incumbent profits
so that they reflect reasonable (i.e., efficient) rather than historical
revenues and costs. To their credit, they recognize the need for such
an adjustment with respect to future profits. Specifically, they recognize that the incumbent utility's expected net profit under competition, R 2' - C2 , must be adjusted to take "into account the likelihood
and magnitude of future mitigation. '53 In effect, they recognize that it
is not appropriate to base compensation on whatever future revenues
and costs turn out to be. If the incumbent utility is told in advance
that it will be fully compensated for any shortfall in profits caused by
competition, then it will have no incentive to try to maximize its future
revenues or to minimize its future costs. No matter how small the
profits under competition, R 2' - C2' , they will be offset by larger compensation payments. To counteract this perverse incentive, Sidak and
Spulber recognize that compensation payments must be reduced by
some fixed amount in order to "preserve incentives for mitigation by
the firm while sharing the gains from mitigation with consumers. '5 4
The same general point applies backwards as well as forwards.
Just as the compensation formula cannot accept at face value
whatever future revenues and costs incumbent utilities generate, so
too it should not accept at face value whatever past revenues and costs
the incumbent utility has experienced. To do so locks in as an entitlement any and all excess returns embodied in historical revenues and
costs.

52

See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1139-47.

53 Id. at 1138.

54 Id.
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A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose 1000 units of service are consumed in a given industry. The industry is initially served
by a regulated monopoly incumbent which has invested in fixed capital sufficient to supply all 1000 units. The incumbent ifies tariffs proposing to charge $10 per unit for the service, said to reflect $7 per unit
in variable costs and $3 per unit in return on capital. No one protests
the tariffs, and they take effect without any investigation by the regulators. Subsequently, the industry is deregulated. A new entrant appears who charges $7 per unit for the service, said to reflect $6 per
unit in variable costs and $1 per unit in return on capital. The entrant
has invested in fixed capital sufficient to supply 500 units of service.
The entrant's competition forces the incumbent to lower its price from
$10 to $7, and the incumbent loses half of its market share to the entrant. The incumbent then challenges this turn of events as a deregulatory taking.
What result does the Sidak-Spulber formula dictate in this example? The incumbent's net revenue under regulation, Rlc - Ct2, is

$10,000 - $7,000, or $3,000. Its net revenue under competition, R?' C , depends on what assumption we make about costs. Given Sidak
and Spulber's recognition that mitigation is possible under competition,55 let us assume that the incumbent succeeds in lowering its variable costs to $6 per unit, the same as the entrant's variable costs. Thus,
net revenues or profits under competition are $3,500 - $3,000, or $500.
The reduction in profit caused by competition is $3,000 - $500, or
$2,500. Their formula therefore indicates that the movement from
regulation to competition has caused a taking or breach of contract,
and that the incumbent is entitled to compensation to the tune of
$2,500.
Notice, however, that the incumbent's historical revenues
($10,000) and historical costs ($7,000) appear to be excessive. We
know this because the entrant is able to offer service at lower unit
prices, reflecting both lower variable costs and lower costs of capital.
The incumbent's historical variable costs are $7 per unit while the entrant's are $6 per unit, and the incumbent's historical cost of capital is
$3 per unit while the entrant's is $1 per unit. If we assume that the
entrant's actual costs are an accurate measure of the incumbent's reasonable costs, then the adjusted revenues and costs of the incumbent
under regulation would be $7,000 - $6,000, or $1,000. After adjustment, the Sidak-Spulber formula would suggest that the correct
amount of compensation is $1,000 - $500, or $500.
55

See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 1, at 921-22.
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In this particular example, adjusting revenues and costs under
regulation to reflect reasonable revenues and costs does not change
the conclusion that there has been a taking. This seems to be the intuitively correct result, for the introduction of competition in the example gives rise to stranded capital equal to one-half the incumbent's
fixed plant investment. Nevertheless, the adjustment has a dramatic
impact on the level of compensation required, reducing it from $2,500
to $500. This again seems to be the intuitively correct result, for the
introduction of competition has revealed that $2,000 of the $3,000 in
profits being earned by the incumbent under regulation were based on
overvalued costs of capital. Adjusting historical costs to reasonable
costs and a competitive return on capital eliminates the requirement
of paying compensation for lost profits that the incumbent never
should have been allowed to earn in the first place.
A much more straightforward approach to determining whether
compensation is required is simply to apply the constitutional standard after the transition to competition is complete. Specifically, one
would ask whether the incumbent utility in the post-competition
world is earning sufficient revenue to cover its reasonable costs and
earn a competitive return on its investment. What constitutes a competitive return on investment would in turn be a function in part of
risks to the utility associated with the particular rate base chosen by
the relevant regulatory authority.
As applied to our hypothetical example, the revenues of the incumbent utility after competition are $3,500, and its reasonable costs,
as revealed by the per unit costs incurred by the entrant, are $3,000.
This yields $500 in contribution to capital costs. Let us assume, again
based on the behavior of the entrant, that the competitive return on
capital is $1 per unit. If the jurisdiction adopts a prudent original investment rate base, then the rate base would include capital sufficient
to supply the entire market, or 1000 units, and a competitive return on
this investment would be $1000. The $500 contribution to capital that
the incumbent earns under competition is clearly insufficient, and
compensation would be owed to make up the difference.5 6 If the jurisdiction adopts a used and useful definition of the rate base, then the
56 Although the Supreme Court has made it clear for constitutional purposes that regulators are free to adopt as a standard either a competitive return on historic investment or
a competitive return on replacement cost, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S.
299, 315-16 (1989), competitive markets always value assets on the basis of replacement
cost rather than historic cost. This means that if an asset has a historic cost of $2 million,
but a replacement cost of half that amount, and the current competitive rate of return in
the market is 10%, then the competitive return on the asset is $100,000 per year; that is, it
is 5%, not 10%, of the historic cost.
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rate base would include capital sufficient to supply only 500 units, and
there would be no taking. However, if the jurisdiction switches from a
prudent investment to a used and useful rate base simultaneously with
the transition to competition, then a risk premium presumably would
be required in the form of a higher per unit return on capital, and
again it would appear that the deregulation has led to a taking.
As our illustration suggests, direct application of the constitutional standard can lead to the conclusion that compensation is warranted in circumstances where the introduction of competition leads
to significant stranded costs, or substantially increases the riskiness of
investment in utility property. (Of course, if competition does not
lead to significant stranded costs or otherwise materially increase the
risk of investment, the constitutional standard requires no compensation.) In addition, however, direct application of the constitutional
standard avoids any suggestion that utilities are entitled to automatic
recovery of historical revenues and costs, no matter how inflated they
may be. We therefore believe that this is a better approach to determining whether compensation is required than the expectation damages formula favored by Sidak and Spulber.57

57 See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 1. at 919-20. We do not
believe that direct application of the constitutional standard after the transition to competition suffers from the problems that Sidak and Spulber identify with respect to Judge
Stephen Williams' suggested ex post prudency review. See generally Stephen F. Williams,
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 1000 (1996) (responding to Sidak and Spulber). Our approach would not necessarily
entail any regulatory second-guessing of the prudence of historical investment decisions,
because the regulator could accept as conclusive any prior prudency determinations in defining the rate base for constitutional purposes. Alternatively, if the prudence of past decisions were explicitly or implicitly questioned (for example, by adapting a used and useful
rate base), compensation for this additional risk could be provided through an additional
risk premium.
In any event, frequently there will have been no regulatory assessment of the prudence of particular investments before existing rates were approved or allowed to take
effect. Sidak and Spulber argue that there should be no retrospective regulatory review
even in these circumstances, because the failure of major customers to seek review when
the rates were established must mean that expected benefits of such review were insignificant "relative to the costs of [instituting a] rate proceeding." Sidak & Spulber, Givings and
Takings, supra note 1, at 1138. This comment, however, overlooks the free rider barriers to
collective action challenging utility rates. The aggregate benefits of regulatory review for
customers might exceed the aggregate costs of such review, but customers still might be
unable to agree on a formula for apportioning the regulatory costs among themselves, in
which case no regulatory review would take place. When this happens, there is no reason
to adopt a conclusive presumption that historical revenues and costs are reasonable, which
is in effect what the Sidak and Spulber formula does.
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IV
THE TIMING OF THE COMPENSATION INQUIRY

Perhaps the most sharply delineated disagreement that emerges
from our exchange with Sidak and Spulber concerns the timing of the
compensation inquiry. They believe compensation should be estimated and paid up front, before competition comes to local telephony. 58 We believe that the question of compensation can
appropriately be postponed until the returns are in on the consequences of competition for local exchange carriers.
We have previously spelled out the legal basis for our conclusion
that the Takings Clause and the law of contracts do not forbid takings
of property or breaches of contract; they only require the payment of
compensation once a taking or breach occurs. 59 Sidak and Spulber do
not challenge that analysis. To the contrary, they concede that "the
government's police power is distinct from its obligation to pay just
compensation under the Takings Clause. Likewise, the law recognizes
that the payment of damages for breach of contract is a permissible
alternative to performing the contract. ' 60 Nevertheless, they insist
that regulators should adopt pricing policies and end-user fees before
competition commences that are sufficiently generous to "avoid the
'6
takings issue." '
The principal legal argument Sidak and Spulber advance in support of ex ante compensation is the canon of statutory interpretation
that calls upon courts (and by extension agencies) to interpret statutes
so as to avoid having to decide constitutional questions. 62 As authority, they cite Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 63 urging the Court to adopt
a general policy of avoiding constitutional rulings whenever possible. 64
In fact, however, the canon invoked by Sidak and Spulber is only one
of seven prudential rules endorsed by Justice Brandeis for skirting unnecessary constitutional decisions. 65 Among the others is the rule that
"[tjhe Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' "66 This prudential rule counseling against premature resolution of constitutional questions sup58
59
60
61

See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1077.
See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1051-52.
Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1078.
Id. at 1077.

62 See id.

63 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
64 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1077.
65 See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 346 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs., 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
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ports our position, since it is not clear at this point that there will be
any unrecovered stranded costs. Obviously, if it turns out there are no
stranded costs, the takings question potentially raised by the local
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act is avoided because such a question does not exist.
Since each of us can point to a cannon of avoidance in support of
our respective positions, a more particularized inquiry is necessary to
determine which maxim is most germane. In this regard, we would
note that the canon favored by Sidak and Spulber is most often invoked where ambiguous statutes impinge on free speech and that it
has the consequence of overprotecting constitutional norms.67 This
has been explained on the grounds of "the Court's long-standing opinion that free speech rights are fragile and need breathing room to survive; governmental actions that violate or even chill those rights are
disfavored. '68 In contrast, this canon has been invoked relatively
rarely in the context of takings claims. 69 On the other hand, the
maxim we endorse-avoiding premature adjudication of constitutional claims-has an especially robust tradition in cases raising takings claims. 70 Thus, we believe that courts are more likely to find our
prudential maxim germane than the one invoked by Sidak and
Spulber.
We also believe that postponement of the compensation requirement simply makes more sense here. We have no doubt that "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."'71 But we are equally
sure that a pound of prevention is not worth an ounce of cure. One
problem with demanding generous compensation to avoid any takings
question before competition even starts is the extremely high risk of
error. There are simply too many variables and too much uncertainty
about how individual variables should be resolved. We also believe
that there is a high risk that an ex ante compensation inquiry would be
unduly biased in favor of excessively generous compensation awards.
67 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Savings Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945,1966-69 (1997)
(reviewing rationale and applications for canon).
68 Id. at 1968.
69 The one example they cite, United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70

(1982), did not ultimately apply the canon of avoidance but rather the canon that favors
interpretations preserving statutes from invalidation. See id. at 78-81. The Court in that

case did not "avoid" the constitutional question; to the contrary, it devoted five pages to
analysis of that question, and strongly intimated that the statute would violate the Takings
Clause if interpreted to apply to pre-enactment property rights. See id. at 73-78. On the

basis of this analysis, the Court then interpreted the statute to apply only to postenactment rights. See id. at 81.
70 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1051-52 no.54-56 (citing cases in support of
this proposition).
71 Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1077.
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With respect to the uncertainty of the variables, consider (as only
one illustration of many difficulties) the implications of Sidak and
Spulber's discussion about the significance of whether competition is
the product of "endogenous regulatory change" or "exogenous
changes in technology and market demand. '72 They say the former
may give rise to an obligation to pay compensation, but the latter does
not. 73 We are inclined to agree. They also say that sometimes competition may be the product of "joint causation," i.e., both endogenous
and exogenous change, in which case "careful factual analysis will be
necessary to attribute to each causal factor the correct portion of the
incumbent's costs that that particular factor has rendered unrecoverable."' 74 We see no reason to disagree with this statement either.
Consider, however, the implications of this analysis of joint causation for Sidak and Spulber's position that regulators should determine
compensation ex ante. The economic forces unleashed by opening up
any regulated monopoly to competitive access will almost always be
partly a function of the legal change and partly a function of changes
in technology and market forces. It is difficult enough to impose upon
a regulatory agency the task of figuring out in advance what the total
impact of competition is likely to be for an incumbent utility. But how
is an agency (or a court) supposed to determine what percentage of
this predicted impact will be attributable to legal change and what
percentage to changing technology and market forces? The prospect
that any agency composed of mere mortals will get this prediction
right is remote indeed. Far better to survey the actual impact of the
change on the incumbent utility after the transition to competition is
complete, at which time it may be possible to draw some sensible conclusions about the relative impact of legal change and other forces
that bear on the incumbent's economic fate.
Moreover, regulators may well prove to be biased in favor of
overly large awards if asked to determine compensation ex ante. As
emphasized in Part III, a critical variable in any compensation inquiry
is the extent to which historical revenues and costs conceal excessive
returns. Regulators who have been charged with overseeing and in
some cases establishing historical utility rates may not be prone to
judge their own efforts as having sanctioned monopoly pricing, padded expenses, or wasteful practices. Thus, they may well be inclined
to view historical revenues and costs as fully justified, and regard any

72

Id. at 1093.

73 See id.
74

Id.
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predicted shortfall in profits as giving rise to a requirement of
compensation.
If the compensation inquiry is postponed until competition is a
reality, in contrast, regulators will be less able to ignore evidence of
past monopoly pricing or inefficiency. If new entrants demonstrate
that it is possible to operate more efficiently, then the incumbent will
either have to adopt the more efficient practices itself or be at pains to
explain why it has failed to do so. The entire rationale for replacing a
system of regulation with a system of competition is the belief that
competition is better than regulation at squeezing out waste and inefficiency. If this assumption proves to be correct, then regulators will
have considerable difficulty endorsing the cost structure that existed
under regulation as a fixed entitlement. If it turns out that the efficiency does not materialize, then of course the incumbent should be
made whole for any recoverable stranded costs.
V
STRANDED COSTS IN LOCAL TELEPHONY

The final area of significant disagreement concerns the magnitude
of stranded costs that will be generated by the local competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act. Sidak and Spulber are right in
saying that the main disagreement between us here is factual, the
question being whether local telephone companies have substantial
fixed and common costs that will be stranded by competition. We
have not carried out any empirical studies of these matters. But Sidak
and Spulber do not claim to have done so either. The issue therefore
is which side offers the more plausible prediction about the future,
based on what we know about the telephone industry, the prominent
features of the Telecommunications Act, and the likely path of implementation of that Act by federal and state regulators.
We begin with a point that is often overlooked in discussions of
stranded costs: These must be fixed and common costs. Fixed costs
are not coterminous with sunk costs. A cost that is sunk is an expenditure that was made in the past that cannot quickly be recouped. Often
costs that are variable and common will be sunk in this sense. This is
true of any physical plant whose cost can be adjusted up or down
before the commitment to incur it is taken, or can be adjusted up or
down when it comes time to replace it, such as a decision to purchase
a fleet of repair trucks. 75 Fixed costs, in contrast, are costs that cannot
be adjusted up or down with the anticipated volume of future busi75 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing examples of difference between
fixed and variable common costs).
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ness. For example, if a railroad is to deliver coal from mine X to electric utility plant Y, it must lay the rails between origin and destination,
and the length of the roadbed cannot be reduced if the volume of coal
carried undergoes a decline. Consequently, railroad operations are
generally understood to entail huge fixed costs, which of course also
happen to be sunk costs.
This is not just a quibble about terminology. The discussion has
already shown that variable common costs do not require any price
supplement above the incremental cost of a service. 76 By definition,
long run incremental costs already include all costs, common or otherwise, that are variable. Thus, variable costs that are sunk will automatically be included in any proper calculation of interconnection
prices based on incremental cost principles, and to provide additional
recovery for these costs in the guise of stranded cost recovery would
entail double counting.
On first consideration it is likely to seem that the fixed and common costs of telecommunications, like the fixed costs of railroads and
electric utilities, must be enormous, and thus that Sidak and Spulber
are right in arguing that the prices charged by the local companies to
their competitors will have to be well above incremental costs in order
to ensure financial viability. But this is not necessarily the case.
While local telephone companies undoubtedly have very large sunk
costs, a substantial portion of these costs are variable, because they
can, in the long run, be adjusted up and down depending on the expected volume of future business. This is true, for example, of the
technology and capacity of central office switching equipment, the capacity of trunk lines, and so forth. Of course, local telephone companies have some fixed costs, as any business does. But the portion of
the sunk costs of local telephone companies that are fixed and common is undoubtedly much smaller than is true of railroads or electric
utilities.
In any event, whatever the magnitude of fixed and common costs
in the local telephone industry may be, we concur that regulation must
not preclude their recovery. But the amount recovered must not be
based on shabby reasoning, confusing sunk costs with fixed costs, variable costs with fixed costs, replacement costs with historic costs, or
arbitrary allocations that simply inflate the pertinent magnitudes. The
desirability of such careful accounting practices seems obvious
enough, yet we have all too often seen them disregarded in practice.
What then can be said more specifically by way of predicting the
amount of fixed and common costs in local telephony that are likely to
76

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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be stranded by the introduction of competition under the provisions
of the Telecommunications Act? In our previous article, we cited five
reasons why the local telephone industry is not likely to present a significant stranded cost problem, at least relative to what may happen
under full competition in electricity generation. 77 First, local telephone competition in the early years is likely to be based on entrants'
rental of LEC facilities rather than the building of duplicate systems. 78
Facilities gainfully rented at compensatory prices cannot give rise to
stranded costs. Second, technological change is far more rapid in telecommunications than in the supply of electric power, meaning that
telecommunications plant and equipment rapidly become obsolete. 79
Plants that will be written off as obsolete and replaced cannot be regarded as stranded investments. Third, local telephone plants are very
adaptable to multiple uses, suggesting that a loss in traditional local
telephone business can be offset by growth in demand for alternative
services.8 0 Fourth, the prospect that local companies will be permitted
to enter the long-distance market, in exchange for the inauguration of
effective local competition, constitutes a clear quid pro quo for any
loss of local service revenues resulting from local competitive entry.81
Finally, the Telecommunications Act provides another offset to possible stranded costs by requiring the FCC to adopt competitively neutral universal service fees to cover the costs of incumbency burdens.82
All of this adds up to the conclusion that stranded costs resulting from
competitive local entry can be expected to be very modest and substantially precompensated.
Only one of these points has elicited any significant response
from Sidak and Spulber-the fourth, concerning regulatory quid pro
quos. 83 Here, as in other areas of the discussion, we find no disagreement at the level of general principle. The authors concede that "[i]n
77
78
79

See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1057-61.
See id. at 1058-59.
See id. at 1059.

so See id. at 1059-60.
81 See id. at 1060-61.

82 See id. at 1061.
83 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1094-96. In fact, far from
criticizing our five factors, Sidak and Spulber are generous enough to point out a sixth that
we overlooked. They point out that as the regulator
removes price controls, so that the incumbent firm has pricing flexibility to
compete with new entrants, the regulator will enable the firm to mitigate its
losses from deregulation and thus reduce its need for compensation for takings. Similarly, the lifting of regulatory obligations borne by the incumbent
firm will reduce its costs after deregulation.
Id. at 1094-95. This enhanced ability to mitigate stranded costs is yet another reason why
the existence and magnitude of stranded costs, if any, cannot be determined until the Act is
fully implemented.
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principle, if deregulatory givings are large enough in their value, the
regulator will be able to eliminate the need for any explicit payment
of compensation to the regulated firm." 84 Nevertheless, Sidak and
Spulber advance two arguments seeking to cast doubt on whether the
magnitude of the regulatory "givings" will be sufficient to offset or
substantially reduce the regulatory taking they perceive as inevitably
flowing from the advent of local competition.
First, Sidak and Spulber suggest that entry into the interLATA
long-distance market 85 would provide sufficient revenues to offset the
loss of profits in the local exchange market only if the LECs could
earn supercompetitive profits in the interLATA market.86 This they
suggest is implausible, given that the interLATA long-distance market
is already served by four companies and is perceived to be highly
competitive. 87
There are, however, several reasons besides supercompetitive
pricing in the current interLATA market why the LECs might find the
long-distance service attractive. One has already been mentioned: 8
Given the LECs' control over bottleneck facilities needed to complete
long-distance calls, they may anticipate that regulators will allow them
to charge interconnection prices to their competitors that will be sufficiently high to give them a competitive advantage. This will not happen, of course, if interconnection prices are based on a correct
application of ECPR principles. But it will be more than ironic if
LECs are awarded compensation ex ante on the assumption that
ECPR pricing will lead to stranded costs, and then ECPR prices are
modified in the implementation process or through judicial maneuvering, with the result that the LECs earn supercompetitive profits in the
long-distance market.
More benign explanations for the LECs' yearning to enter longdistance are also available. Given the huge investments they have already made in telecommunications plant and infrastructure, the LECs
may believe that they can exploit economies of scope and scale in offering long-distance service. Thus, they may believe that they can operate at lower costs than existing long-distance carriers, which would
translate into higher profits (at least until this advantage is eliminated
84 Id. at 1095.
85 The LATAs (Local Access Transport Areas) are the geographic areas into which the
United States was divided for regulatory purposes when AT&T agreed to divest itself of
the LECs. InterLATA long-distance service includes a large portion of interstate telecommunications activity.
86 See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 1, at 1090.
87

See id.

88

See supra Part I.
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through additional competitive entry). Alternatively, or in addition,
the LECs may believe that they have inherent marketing advantages
in offering "one-stop" telecommunications shopping (combining local,
long-distance, Internet, cellular, and video services in various integrated packages) because they may be perceived by many customers
as the most logical single source. In any event, exactly why the LECs
think they can obtain additional profits from entry into long-distance
service is less important, for present purposes, than the fact they
plainly do harbor such a belief, as their tireless efforts to obtain permission to enter this market demonstrate.
Second, Sidak and Spulber suggest that access to the interLATA
market cannot count as a regulatory "giving" because the Telecommunications Act may have made it more rather than less difficult for the
LECs to gain access to this market.8 9 They argue that regulators cannot erect new regulatory barriers and then obtain credit for eliminating these barriers as an offset against the compensation required for
other actions that constitute a taking.90
However, the characterization of the Telecommunications Act as
a "new" regulatory barrier is questionable at best. The LECs were
vigorous proponents of the Act, precisely because they saw it as accelerating the end of the regulatory "quarantine" erected by the Modified Fmal Judgment entered in United States v. AT&T. 91 The fact that
their entry into the long-distance market has come about more slowly
than they might otherwise prefer is largely attributable to their own
litigation strategy. The Act requires that competition be established
in the local exchange markets before local carriers can enter the longdistance market. And a principal reason why competition has not
been established in the local exchange market is the LECs' vigorous
opposition to pricing formulas and other measures that would open up
the local exchange markets to competition. Indeed, one could turn
the Sidak-Spulber point on its head: Just as regulators should not get
credit for eliminating new barriers of their own creation, so too LECS
should not be able to complain of new barriers of their own creation.
Our basic point with respect to quid pro quos-as also in regard
to the other factors we enumerated in our previous article 92-is simply that there are too many factual variables that remain unresolved
before we can say that the local competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act have created a substantial stranded plant probSee Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1. at 1095.
90 See id. at 1095-96.
91 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (upholding antitrust consent decree ordering divestiture by telecommunications corporation of local operating companies).
92 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1. at 1060-61.
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lem. Sidak and Spulber concede the need for "an empirical valuation
of the givings that the government claims as offsets to the incumbent
firm's taking." 93 When we combine the need for this empirical study
with the factual investigations suggested by our other four factors, we
think that the only verdict that is possible at this time on stranded
costs is "not proven."
VI
Is

THERE

A "FALLACY OF FORWARD-LOOKING COSTS"?

Finally, we must take note of Sidak and Spulber's claim that there
is a "fallacy of forward-looking costs." ' 94 Their argument here is that
the FCC's (partial) requirement that the pertinent costs of plant and
equipment are those of an efficient entrant using the most economical
current technology, rather than the older technology actually employed by the LECs, constitutes a distortion of the forward-looking
cost concept. 95 In rebuttal, they compare the FCC's approach to that
of a buyer who breaches a fixed price contract when a cheaper alternative becomes available. 96 Excusing the breach ignores the fact that
the contract price was set to provide recovery of transaction-specific
investments. In lieu of the FCC's standard, they propose what they
describe as a competitive market standard for the adaptation of prices
to the lower costs of new techniques. 97 Essentially, they assert that in
a competitive market, prices will not fall in response to the availability
of lower-cost equipment until enough such equipment has been introduced to serve all market demand. 98
The first strand of their argument, the notion that investors did
not expect the value of their assets to be reduced by competition from
newer and less costly equipment, 99 seems to us to have little substance. As we discussed in our previous article, the expectation protected by the regulatory contract is that the government will afford
investors an opportunity to earn a competitive return on their investment. 10 0 We doubt very much that investors can show they were
promised at the time of investment that technical change would not be
allowed to undercut the market value of the pertinent assets.
93 Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1095.

94 Id. at 1139-46.
95 See id. at 1140-41 (citing and discussing FCC regulations).
96 See id. at 1143-45.
97 See id. at 1139-40.
98 See id. at 1142-43.
99 See id. at 1145 (explaining that rejection of embedded cost standard is therefore
breach of regulatory contract).
100 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1066.
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More relevant is the Sidak-Spulber observation that in a competitive market the availability of a small amount of less-costly improved
equipment does not immediately lead to an equivalent reduction in
the affected prices.101 This is generally true. However, it is not true
that the old price will normally prevail until enough of the new equipment is available to meet all market demand. In an effectively competitive market, if it is possible for the new equipment to be made
available in the desired quantity in, say, two years, the price reduction
cannot be delayed more than two years, whether or not the newer
assets are actually adopted. This is true even if none of the new equipment is actually introduced,particularly where sales are carried out by
contract and predominantly to business customers. These customers,
knowing that they can make lower-price contracts with potential entrants effective two years hence, can use the threat of doing so to force
incumbents to offer equally reduced prices, whether or not those incumbents actually replace their old assets. Unless an incumbent
quickly commits itself to lower prices effective no later than two years
(in our example) from the introduction of the improved technology,
entrants will rapidly contract with the incumbent's customers to become their future suppliers at the lower prices the new technology
makes possible. Knowing that they face this threat of potential competition, even incumbents with outdated high-cost equipment will be
forced to adjust their prices to efficient costs.
Sidak and Spulber do have a valid point when they note that
some delay may occur in the reduction of asset values and product
price in response to the introduction of more efficient technology.10 2
However, that delay is generally very limited, and the competitive
market standard cited by Sidak and Spulber 03 certainly does not justify indefinite postponement of the efficient cost standard for pricing.
We conclude that, perhaps with some minor readjustment, the FCC's
proposed standard-and indeed, one that is based even more exclusively on efficient costs-is entirely consistent with the competitive
market model and with the forward-looking cost criterion for public
interest pricing.
VII
CONCLUDING COIiENT

The considerable overlap between the analytical positions taken
by Sidak and Spulber and us may conceal more than it reveals. Per101 See Sidak & Spulber, Givings and Takings, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 1139.
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haps most important, by concentrating on the role of ECPR and the
importance of competitive neutrality in setting interconnection prices,
Sidak and Spulber have diverted attention away from their compensation formula, which establishes an entitlement of full recovery of all
historical revenues and costs. This formula is a more generous measure of compensation than that required by the Constitution or the
regulatory contract, and certainly has no grounding in economics.
Their position on compensation stands forward-looking costing on its
head. Similarly, by treating the question of the timing of the compensation inquiry as a matter of regulatory prudence in avoiding constitutional questions, Sidak and Spulber have shifted attention away from
the extremely serious practical problems associated with ex ante compensation, not to mention the considerable likelihood that it would
lead to excessive recoveries.
Moreover, the large degree of agreement on the principles for
establishing interconnection prices tends to hide from view the extensive distortions in the prices of local telephone services that undermine the efficiency properties of ECPR pricing. These distortions are
generally the product of agreements between local regulators and local telephone companies. It is noteworthy that the latter have in many
states fought tooth and nail to preserve these distortions, battling to
stave off attempts by potential competitors to correct them.
Our agreement on the theory of the matter also invites confusion
between the substantial sunk costs and the much more modest fixed
costs of the local telephone companies. A legitimate ECPR covers
the latter by a pricing supplement above incremental cost, but does
not provide a supplement for the former, because those costs are already included as a variable magnitude in the long run incremental
cost of any service.
Finally, the degree of agreement on theory draws attention away
from our very substantial difference in evaluation of the facts, for
what evidence we have seen indicates that the stranded costs are likely
to be quite modest. We continue to believe that interconnection
prices should be based on the incremental costs entailed in providing
services to competitors with some minor adaptation for fixed and
common costs, or some alternative and competitively neutral form of
compensation (such as a universal service fund) to cover all remaining
legitimate costs at issue.
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